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HOW AND WHY THE MARKETPLACE
OF IDEAS FAILS*
PAUL H. BRIETZKE**
I. INTRODUCTION
I am grateful for the opportunity to address this distinguished Conference.
It will be interesting to compare our discussions with those from the possibly
even more distinguished London P.E.N. Symposium on the 300th Anniversary
of Areopagitica, in 1944.' We would presumably adopt (President) E.M.
Forster's observations on the pleasures and the duty of getting our minds clear
for the future, 2 but many of the P.E.N. participants' World War II concerns are
not ours. Their world is no longer ours, any more than Milton's (or Holmes')
world is ours. Each generation must reinvent the worthy Areopagitica to reflect
its own concerns, and my perhaps unpopular argument is that an accumulation
of currently-inappropriate assumptions around the "Areopagitica idea"
necessitate a substantial reformulation of that idea.
Areopagitica is thought3 to enter our First Amendment jurisprudence
through Justice Holmes' (and Justice Brandeis') Abrams dissent, in 1919:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
Presented to the Free Speech in a Democratic Society Conference, celebrating the 350th
Anniversary of Milton's Areopagitica, Tampa, Nov. 1994.
"" Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.A., Lake Forest College; J.D.,
University of Wisconsin; Ph.D., University of London.
1. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A SYMPOSIUM (Herman Ould ed., 1970).
2. E.M. Forster, Presidential Address, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A SYMPOSIUM 9, 10
(Herman Ould ed., 1970).
3. Holmes' analogy has been traced to persons influenced by Milton-Jefferson and Mill for
example-as well as to Milton. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring) (Abrams marketplace of ideas notion based on Jefferson's
writings); Harold J. Laski, The Areopagitica of Milton After 300 Years, in FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION: A SYMPOSIUM 168, 177 (Herman Ould ed., 1970) ("the spirit of the Areopagitica
seems once more to come to life" in Holmes' "great dissent"); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of
Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (ideas from Mill and in Areopagitica first
introduced into American law by Abrams dissent); Thomas David Jones, Article 4 of the
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and the First
Amendment, 23 HOw. L.J. 429, 448-49 (1980) (Milton's and Mill's "myopic" and "Olympian belief
in the free trade of ideas," that the good and true must always triumph over the evil and false).
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better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.'
Along with Justice Brandeis' (and Justice Holmes') Whitney concurrence,5 this
Abrams analogy of ideas to markets reflects a joint effort to "sell" a judicial
activism over the First Amendment to their colleagues and to the public. That
their sales effort succeeded is shown by the subsequent judicial willingness to
draw their analogy. 6 Analogy is the weakest form of argument in logic, but it
is frequently the best we have in law. It is thus unfortunate that their
marketplace of ideas analogy depends upon four implicit and "implausible
assumptions for its coherence."" A coherent structure of free speech analysis
arguably cannot be built upon so much implausibility.
.Much of this implausibility was not obvious to Holmes (or to Milton), but
implausibility now serves to mar the analogy's rhetorical beauty. For example,
Charles Lawrence can plausibly argue that: "The American marketplace of
ideas was founded with the idea of the racial inferiority of non-whites as one of
4. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (Prior to World
War I, the First Amendment attracted little political, judicial, or scholarly interest.).
5. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
6. The most comprehensive list is Ingber's, supra note 3, at 2 n.2:
See, e.g., Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
866-67 (1982); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981); Citizens Against
Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 760 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826
(1975); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248 (1974); Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 382
(1967).
I would add to this list: Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 592-94 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (no sharp distinction between a marketplace for
goods and a marketplace for ideas can long be maintained); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (classrooms as the quintessential marketplace of ideas); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) (obscenity unprotected because it does not contribute to the
marketplace of ideas); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 285 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("The free trade in ideas which the Framers . . . visualized disappears. In its place there is
substituted a new orthodoxy, an orthodoxy that changes with the whims of the day."); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503, 545-46, 549-50, 553 (1951).
7. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 3 (1989).
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its chief commodities, and ever since the market opened, racism has remained
its most active item in trade."8
I will illustrate some of my arguments with references to R.A. V. ,9 the most
serious challenge that the marketplace of ideas analogy has faced recently. In
R.A. V., a minor (allegedly) burnt a wooden cross on an African-American
family's lawn and was charged under a Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance. The
Supreme Court held this Ordinance to be an unconstitutional infringement on
R.A.V.'s free speech rights.
II. INAPPROPRIATE ASSUMPTIONS
The first of the Holmes/Brandeis implicit assumptions is that their analogy
is logically defensible, that there are enough significant points of resemblance
between the speech process and the economists' model of a "free" (unregulated)
and competitive market for goods and services-if only judges will perfect
speech competition by striking down such governmental regulations as they can
identify. I° This is similar to Milton's arguments," if he would permit his
pre-capitalist and not overtly materialist sentiments to be dressed up in the
language of a neoclassical economics-a field where Holmes displayed more
enthusiasm than expertise. Milton was, however, reluctant to trust to something
like market forces when it came to blasphemous and atheistic tracts,12 just as
8. Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,
1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 468. See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional
Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 385-86 (1991) (Racist speech lends credibility to
views of the dominant group and disempowers any minority rebuttal, "a result at odds, certainly,
with marketplace theories of the first amendment.") A powerful "narrative jurisprudence" about
minority suffering serves as a counterweight to uncritical celebrations of First Amendment doctrines.
9. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). White, Blackmun, Stevens, and
O'Connor, JJ., believed the ordinance to be invalid because it was "overbroad," while the other five
Justices (per Scalia, J.) held the ordinance to be "facially" invalid under the First Amendment,
because it purported to regulate the content of speech. R.A.V. was guilty under a content-neutral
criminal law of trespass, however.
10. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 592-94.
11. It is harder than the alchemist's task, "to sublimat any good use out of" licensing
restrictions on the publication of books. John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech of Mr. John Milton
for the Liberty of Unlicenc'd Printing. To the Parliament of England (1644), in THE PROSE OF JOHN
MILTON 265, 282-83 (J. Max Patrick ed., 1967) [hereinafter Areopagitica]. An "Oligarchy of
twenty ingrossers" (i.e., monopolists or what we would call oligopolists today) would try "to bring
a famin upon our minds again" by restraining publication. Id. at 325. See THE SHORTER OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 612 (3d ed. 1967) (meaning of "engross" in
1596).
12. Milton praised the Athenian censors' banning of "blasphemous and Atheisticall" materials,
while they tolerated "voluptuousnesses and the denying of divine providence. ... ." Areopagitica,
supra note 11, at 273-74. He condemns the Pope's going beyond "matters Hereticall" to censor all
writings in 1515, "as if S. Peter had bequeath'd them the keys of the Presse." Id. at 279, 279 n.91.
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judges today do not trust the marketplace to govern hard-core pornography.13
In any event, numerous "failures" can be discovered in any ideas marketplace-
for example, the racism reflected in R.A.V. These failures cast doubt on the
appropriateness of the marketplace of ideas analogy, and they can be used to
justify some of the governmental regulations that the justices abhor.
The second assumption, made explicit by Milton, 4 by the Justices'
Whitney concurrence, and later by Justices Harlan 5 and Brennan, 6 is that the
St. Paul's followers could burn the "magick" Ephesian books because this was a private, voluntary
act. Id. at 286. See F.E. HUTCHINSON, MILTON AND THE ENGLISH MIND 65 (1946) (Milton's
tolerance does not extend to "popery and open superstition. ... ").
13. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 29 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484-85 (1957) (obscenity is unprotected because it does not contribute to the marketplace of ideas).
14. Perhaps Milton's strongest argument is that the "State shall be my governours, but not my
criticks; they may be mistak'n in the choice of a licencer, as easily as this licencer may be mistak'n
in an author...." Areopagitica, supra note 11, at 302. Tongue in cheek, he praises Parliament's
obedience to "the voice of reason from what quarter soever it be heard," and he begins by noting
that the "utmost bound of civill liberty [is] attain'd ... when complaints are freely heard, deeply
consider'd, and speedily reform'd. . . ." Id. at 266, 277.
As a humanist, Milton stresses the development of a civic "vertu" which is very Christian and
otherwise very different from Machiavelli's. See id. at 288, 296-97. Having proclaimed the "first
tidings" of Reformation, England is now full of the "backwardest schollers" because of suppressions
by Churchmen. Id. at 320. But through "the solidest and sublimest points of controversie and new
invention," England could cast "off the old and wrincl'd skin of corruption" and become "a noble
and puissant Nation rousing herself." Id. at 324. (This kind of "progressive" nationalism is seen
in many of the less critical celebrations of the First Amendment). An "inquisitionall rigor" has not
made Italy and Spain "the better, the honester, the wiser, the chaster." Id. at 298. See
HUTCHINSON, supra note 12, at 61 (Milton allows "Church and Commonwealth to keep a vigilant
eye upon such publications as may infect the nation with dangerous mischief, but he warns against
the still greater danger of fettering the expression of opinion."); Laski, supra note 3, at 171 (Milton
believed that knowledge unlocks all doors to virtue and to rightful power). Areopagitica is "the first
fundamental plea for extending the idea of religious liberation to every sphere of secular life." Id.
15. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (per Harlan, J.):
The constitutional right of free expression is .. .designed and intended to remove
governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to
what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of
such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity
and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual
dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.
See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH
IN AMERICA 240-41 (1986): historically, speech activity was an "integral and vital element" in
moving from autocracy to democracy, and in reducing citizen antagonism and estrangement. But
see id. at 229: the "actual relationship" between free speech and political decisionmaking is "subtle
and concerned with developing a general capacity rather than with feeding units of information into
a mental machine." (This "general capacity" arguably remains underdeveloped, despite an abundant
free speech.)
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ideas marketplace is essential to an effective functioning of the democratic
process. Government serves an informed electorate by making informed
decisions, the relevant information having been mediated and coordinated
through the ideas marketplace. This is the "place" where political ideas attain
a legitimacy by passing the tests of a fair process, legitimacy being the basis for
recognizing genuine political obligations. Nothing could be more important
under our Constitution than an effective democratic process. Alexander
Meiklejohn makes this assumption into the centerpiece of his absolutist
protection of the "political" speech category-as part of a "systemic" freedom
rather than as an individual right.' 7 The problem is that we can scarcely
recognize the process or system addressed by this assumption, since it amounts
to an eighteenth century, Federalist No. 51 kind of democracy. In such a
democracy, there is an active public participation, a relative equality among
speech inputs and outputs, and a freedom from the overweening influence of
organized interest groups, political action committees, media "sound bites," and
an attendant public cynicism about the fairness of the process.
The third assumption is that a fragmented society, where individuals are
isolated one from another except as markets coordinate their ideas and activities,
is both what we have and what we want. People are seen as deeply rational
loners who are comfortable with uncertainty, complexity, and more than a little
disorder. We are supposedly eager to demonstrate our dignity, autonomy, and
tolerance while avidly debating the issues of the day. 8 This assumption is seen
16. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
[T]he First Amendment... has a structural role to play in securing and fostering our
republican system of self-government .... Implicit in this structural role is not only
"the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open," . . . but also the antecedent assumption that valuable public debate-as well as
other civic behavior-must be informed. The structural model links the First
Amendment to that process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and
thus entails solicitude not only for communication itself, but for the indispensable
conditions of meaningful communication.
Id.
17. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 18-19,
22-27 (1948); Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245.
See BOLLINGER, supra note 15, at 46 (citing Meiklejohn, nothing more constricting than a ROBERT'S
RULES OF ORDER is appropriate for regulating citizens performing their sovereign functions); id. at
61 (quoting Meiklejohn, "To be afraid of ideas.., is to be unfit for self-government."); infra notes
24-36 and accompanying text (analyses of "political" speech).
18. See BAKER, supra note 7, at 7; BOLLINGER, supra note 15, at 239, 247; Delgado, supra
note 8, at 379; Steven Helle, Whither the Public's Right (Not) to Know? Milton, Malls, and
Multicultural Speech, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (the assumption that individuals are rational
and have an existence or meaning apart from society is implausible under the philosophies of Hume,
Rousseau, and Durkheim); David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV.
445, 476-77, 479 (1987) (under social contract theories, legitimacy turns on opportunities for
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at play in Areopagitica,9 is vulnerable to a communitarian critique,' and is
markedly at odds with a frequently-observed intolerance and the pursuit of
personal security through a quietude and conformity.
Milton is at his most interesting and eloquent2 in the fourth assumption
individual political participation); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest
Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 535.
19. See MAUREEN QUILLIGAN, MILTON'S SPENSER: THE POLITICS OF READING 48 (1983):
in Areopagitica, "readers will never learn [to] distinguish good from evil unless they are allowed
a choice." A learning process is necessary because good and evil look so much alike. Id. When
"God did enlarge the universall diet of mans body, saving ever the rules of temperance, he then also
... left arbitrary the dyeting and repasting of our minds. . . ." Areopagitica, supra note 11, at
286. The "rules of temperance" would appear to permit some governmental regulation of the
intemperate and, here and elsewhere, the "repasting" of the mind is treated as a matter between the
individual and God. Compare Salvador de Madariaga, Liberty in Society, in FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION: A SYMPOSIUM 58, 62 (Herman Ould ed., 1970) (quoted in note 20, infra).
20. See, e.g., Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH.
L. REv. 685 (1992). Criticizing Milton, Salvador de Madariaga, supra note 19, argues that:
Society cannot fully know itself ... since even man cannot fully know himself....
mhe only approach to knowledge which may enable a society to live not quite as a
lunatic asylum is through study of collective life. Now the complexity, the subtlety, the
vastness of collective life ... is so monstrously out of proportion with the powers of
even the cleverest of us that nothing but the free exchange of trials and errors of all the
men of good will [will suffice].
de Madariaga, supra note 19, at 62. (Note the "men of good will" qualification that presumably
excludes racists like R.A.V.).
21. It is only the "troublers," the "dividers of unity," who would prevent an assembly of pieces
of the body of "Truth." Areopagitica, supra note 11, at 318. Milton asks: "[W]ho ever knew
Truth put to the wors, in a free and open encounter. Her confuting is the best and surest
suppressing." Id. at 327. Like Holmes', Milton's Truth "can never be stabilised or defined. It is
in a continuous state of emergence. .. ." Herbert Read, On Milton's Areopagitica, in FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION: A SYMPOsIUM 122, 127 (Herman Ould ed., 1970). But Milton departs from the
practices of many today when he puts orthodoxy and authority (especially biblical authority) forward
as standards of truth. de Madariaga, supra note 19, at 59. God functions as the prototypical deus
ex machina in some of Milton's arguments. See supra note 12. When "false teachers are...
busiest in seducing; ... God then raises to his own work men of rare abilities. . . ." Areopagitica,
supra note 11, at 330. To take a famous example, someone "who destroyes a good Booke, kills
reason it selfe, kills the Image of God . . ." Id. at 272. Note the good book qualification: until
the Inquisition, "Books were ever as freely admitted into the World as any other birth; . . . but if
it prov'd a Monster, who denies, but that it was justly burnt, or sunk into the Sea." Id. at 281.
(Such burning and sinking can and have been treated as marketplace transactions, but this absence
of a "prior restraint" as a justification for subsequent restraints will jar many contemporary readers.)
Milton's Truth is discovered through purification: "that which purifies us is triall ... by what
is contrary." Id. at 288. (This echoes a Hegelian dialectic-without a materialism of course.) For
"the pure all things are pure"; "knowledge cannot defile, . . if the will and conscience be not
defil'd." Id. at 285. (In other words, the kind of "hate speech" tolerated in R.A. V. will not spawn
more racists or make existing racists worse.) What "wisdome can there be to choose, what
continence to forbeare without the knowledge of evill?" Id. at 287. "[Blad books. . . to a discreet
and judicious Reader serve in many respects to discover, to confute, to forwam, and to illustrate."
Id. at 285. (This amounts to a workout in the "intellectual gym" described infra note 23 and
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that helps to account for the continued popularity of the marketplace analogy,
by offering something for everyone. Skeptics, pragmatists, and idealists alike
are mollified because a radical objectivism-"truth" exists and is found through
"robust debate" in the market-coexists with the radical relativism that is given
fullest expression much later, in Gertz: "there is no such thing as a false
idea."22 Justice Holmes sounds like a Social Darwinist or an Adam Smith:
competition will correct pernicious ideas ("upset . . . fighting faiths"), as the
invisible hand of the ideas market (a naturalistic fallacy) guides the truth to
victory. If this were indeed the case, we would expect demonstrably false ideas
(e.g., the racism reflected in R.A. V.) to have lost influence over time. Instead,
we see an ebb and flow in the influence of such ideas, a cycling that appears to
respond to political and socioeconomic events. Like Milton's, our truth seems
to be conditioned by our self-interest and our socialization. Falsity does not
seem to aid in the search for this truth, or even in the search for beliefs in
which we are most confident: "A needle is harder to find in a haystack than in
two pieces of hay," and the notion that false ideas provide an "intellectual
gym," where minds can be strengthened through exercise, reflects an unduly
optimistic assessment of our reactions to falsity.23
accompanying text.) See also infra note 43.
22. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). See Rodney A. Smolla,
Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
171, 182 (1990) (this Gertz statement "emancipated the outrageous opinion from legal censure"
through an "almost nihilistic" denial of constitutional authority to enact community values into law);
Strossen, supra note 18, at 534 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 12-8, at 838 n.17 (2d ed. 1988). ("If the Constitution forces government to allow people to
march, speak and write in favor of peace, brotherhood, and justice, then it must also require
government to allow them to advocate hatred, racism, and even genocide.").
23. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 74 (1982). See
id. at 23 (the fear of losing some truth through regulation is "relevant but hardly dispositive");
Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling,
17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 177 (1982) ("truth" is unlikely to emerge from racial insults,
which "are not intended to inform or convince"; they "invite no discourse, and no speech in
response can cure the inflicted harm"); Ronald Dworkin, Mr. Liberty, N.Y. REV. OF BKS., Aug.
11, 1994, 17, at 20 ("Holmes said that a free marketplace of ideas is the best way to discover truth,
which makes no sense if there are only individual 'can't helps'"-Holmes's strong but intensely
personalized views of morality-"and no real truth for free discussion to discover."); Ingber, supra
note 3, at 15 (if indeed truth defeats falsity, it must be verifiable, objective, and unaffected by
"socioeconomic status, experience, psychological propensities .... societal roles," or the way the
ideas are packaged); Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech Theory and Hateful Words, 60 U. OF CINN.
L. REV. 1, 7 (1991) (like J.S. Mill, "we live in an age 'destitute of faith, but terrified at
skepticism'"); supra note 22; infra note 43. But see Wolfson, supra, at 3 (citing RICHARD POSNER,
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 114 (1990)) (truth is the "consensus which develops over time"
that "should be subjected to a Darwinian survival test"; a free market produces better results than
a "command economy" in ideas, even if the majority comes to believe in astrology).
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III. LEGAL ANALYSES
My description of these four assumptions is arguably necessary because the
most important category-"political" speech 24-wholly depends upon the
marketplace of ideas, and thus on its implausible assumptions. If this
marketplace does not exist and function as imagined, political speech theory
becomes incoherent: there is no basis for believing that the relevant information
is produced, consumed, and then assimilated into a democratic decisionmaking.
The standard move under the dichotomous structure' of speech analysis is to
put "good," protected, political speech (or, in other contexts, literary/artistic or
scientific speech) into opposition with a pre-selected, exceptional category of
unprotected or less-protected speech.2 6 The speech being analyzed will be
24. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 421-36 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring and
citing cases): "Speech about public officials or matters of public concern receives greater protection
than speech about other topics" because regulation raises "the specter that the Government may
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace" and because "government must
remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.... ." (Was R.A.V.'s cross burning of sufficient "public
concern" to merit constitutional protection for this reason?)
25. While the urge to classify things probably inheres in all of thought, the categorization of
speech issues has been an academic and judicial growth industry since Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The Chaplinsky Court admitted that certain kinds of speech are
unprotected because of the harm they impose on individuals and society, and the race was soon on
to develop coherent and persuasive criteria for distinguishing among categories of speech-harm. Id.
at 571-72. These categories emerged slowly, as ad hoe responses to particular cases. Inertia and
traditions of legal reasoning caused the contents of the categories to change more quickly than the
categories themselves. These are conditions conducive to what Kuhn would likely call a "paradigm
shift" in speech theory. See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (1973).
Isolated factors must be organized somehow in order to make legal analysis possible, and
categories offer "familiar landmarks of thought." Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of
Classification, 41 STAN. L. REv. 661, 662 (1989). But, a jurisprudence-by-categorization too
easily becomes a mere pigeonholing, a lazy acceptance of structure as a substitute for clear and hard
thinking.
Some or much creativity gets lost when thoughts are squeezed into narrow categories-usually
two categories at a time, since the pondering of three or more factors simultaneously can be
managed only imperfectly and with difficulty. Facts are approached from an either/or
perspective-they must either be "fighting words" or "political speech" in R.A. V., for example-that
forestalls the search for more relevant, realistic possibilities (e.g., "hate speech") that lurk in the
grey areas between bright-line categories. A false dichotomy (or dilemma) frequently results from
this process of mutual exclusion under a binary logic, and the legal conclusion will often be that you
must take all of it, an absolutist free speech for example, or you will wind up with nothing. See
Paul H. Brietzke, Public Policy: Contract, Abortion and the CA, 18 VAL. U. L. REV. 741, 744-45,
753-54, 761-64 (1984).
26. Delgado, supra note 8. at 377, offers the most complete list of categories of unprotected
speech (one of which will be put in opposition to "political speech" by a judge):
speech used to form a criminal conspiracy or an ordinary contract; speech that
disseminates an official secret; speech that defames or libels someone; speech that is
obscene; speech that creates a hostile workplace; speech that violates a trademark or
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uniquely protected if it seems to fit into the "good" category rather than into the
unprotected category. This will be so unless the speech poses a "clear and
present danger" which cannot be contained within the policies underlying the
unprotected category (that has already been rejected). This "danger" must be
serious indeed: American law treats as marginal inconveniences numerous
speech-acts which judges in some other democracies regard as serious threats to
a political or social stability. Our and their thought processes are certainly not
very precise: "[W]e are merely guessing when we suppress [speech]; but we
are also guessing when we decide not to suppress."27
In R.A. V., Justice Stevens describes a history of the Court "narrowing the
categories of unprotected speech. "21 One effect of this narrowing has been an
explosive expansion in what counts as political speech. The attitude now seems
to be that all non-obscene speech is somehow political, that the benefits from
such speech must outweigh the harms almost by definition, and that the
unprotected speech categories are conventional exceptions to be used sparingly,
if at all, in a mature society. Anything now becomes protected political speech
if (as in R.A. V.) the speaker can claim, with some minimal plausibility, that
plagiarizes another's words; speech that creates an immediately harmful impact or is
tantamount to shouting fire in a crowded theatre; "patently offensive" speech directed
at captive audiences or broadcast on the airwaves; speech that constitutes "fighting
words"; speech that disrespects a judge, teacher, military officer, or other authority
figure; speech used to defraud a consumer; words used to fix prices; words ("stick 'em
up-hand over the money") used to communicate a criminal threat; and untruthful or
irrelevant speech given under oath or during a trial.
See BAKER, supra note 7, at 5 ("the constitutional protection of free speech bars certain
governmental restrictions on noncoercive, nonviolent, substantively valued conduct, including
nonverbal conduct"). Categories of less-protected or "low-value" speech include commercial speech
and sexually-explicit materials.
27. SCHAUER, supra note 23, at 29 (characterizing this as a cost-benefit analysis). See
Landmark Communications Inc., v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978) (The clear and present
"danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil.") (quoting Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)); BAKER, supra note 7, at 29; THEODOR MERON, HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITIQUE OF INSTRUMENTS AND PROCESS 27-28
(1986) (discussing legal practices in other countries); SCHAUER, supra note 23, at 141, 218 n.9;
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-9, at 841-48 (1988) (The Abrams
dissent, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919), "infused more immediacy" into the
clear and present danger test, but it is "marred by ambiguity" and open to the "cynical interpretation
... that speech is protected only so long as it is ineffective."); Kretzmer, supra note 18, at 474 (an
"article of faith," impossible to refute, that dangers of suppressing political speech are greater than
for other types of speech).
28. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 428. In the earlier and closely-divided Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952), the Court banned speech that had a substantial political content: a demand for
action addressed to the Mayor and City Council. Id. at 266. The Court thus condoned "expansive
state censorship" of a "matter of public concern." Id. at 271-72 (Black, J., dissenting). This is
something it would presumably not do today, although the R.A. V. Court repeatedly cites
Beauharnais.
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"persecution" resulted from his or her advocacy of "disfavored ideas." While
the cases announce brave judicial attitudes, analyses seem to be driven by
fear-of the "slippery slope" (or of "letting the camel's nose into the tent") that
often distorts legal reasoning by pouring substance into improbable worst-case
'scenarios. "29
The extreme version of this "parading of the horribles" is that, free speech
being indivisible," the first step away from a fundamentalist First Amendment
inevitably leads down the road to political authoritarianism. The "thought
police" will freeze our political consensus; 3 mere incivility will serve as an
excuse for imposing censorship and reverse discrimination (or a "political
correctness");32 content regulation necessarily leads to a viewpoint regulation,
which is much worse;33 the licensing of specific governmental suppressions
necessarily licenses more general ones;T examinations of "policy" will rapidly
dilute our First Amendment "principle," and society will lose truth; 35 and
socially-valuable experiments in discourse will be abandoned, with the result that
many will be afraid to say anything.
36
The main advantage of having so broad a political speech category, of
adopting so gross a dichotomy, is that this tactic minimizes the risk of
29. See BOLLINGER, supra note 15, at 36 (the "slippery slope" as a "standard argument" in
law); SCHAUER, supra note 23, at 84 ("slippery slope" arguments should include demonstrations that
the slope is particularly slippery over the facts in question); id. at 102-03 (leaving a margin for error
should not mean that the search for principled delineations of the scope of free speech is abandoned);
Strossen, supra note 18, at 518 ("Statements that defame groups convey opinions or ideas on matters
of public concern.").
30. Strossen, supra note 18, at 534.
31. See Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma,
32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 224 (1991); Robert W. McGee, Hate Speech, Free Speech and the
University, 24 AKRON L. REv. 363, 364 (1990).
32. See Anti-Defamation League v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Group
defamation is usually not actionable; however detestable, "this kind of speech ... approaches the
area of political and social commentary."); Marjorie Heins, Banning Words: A Comment on "Words
that Wound," 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 585, 589-90 (1983); Massaro, supra note 31, at 214;
id. at 237 (discussing attitude that all speech resulting from inter-group tensions must be treated as
political speech); Strossen, supra note 18, at 518, 534.
33. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 430 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Wolfson, supra note 23, at 5 (one judicial breach in content neutrality will lead to others, in pursuit
of uniformity and coherence). See also Strossen, supra note 18, at 530.
34. Kretzmer, supra note 18, at 472.
35. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); SCHAUER, supra note 23, at 24.
But see also id. (this concern is "relevant but hardly dispositive. .. ").
36. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 273 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[I]n arguing for
or against the enactment of laws that may differently affect huge groups, it is now very dangerous
to say something critical of one of the groups."). See Alon Harel, Bigotry, Pornography, and the
First Amendment: A Theory of Unprotected Speech, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1887, 1894-95 (1992).
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miscategorization: many of the unprotected, non-political categories have
become so narrow that judges can hardly miss their aim at protecting the
"speech that matters." This tactic carries risks of its own, however, of courts
tolerating the kind of speech-harm that is seen in R.A.V. and that a slight
broadening of some of the categories of unprotected, non-political speech would
minimize.
IV. MARKET FAILURES
Advocates of a broad and absolutist political speech are right: dissenters
are protected against the tyranny of the majority, without having to prove the
"hard-to-measure worth" of free speech.37 This is an obviously-important
protection, during crisis times or when the speech-harm can indeed be cured by
more speech, but it should not forestall the search for protections which are
more "cost-effective" in terms of having fewer speech-harm side effects. The
nature of such protections is suggested by persistent critiques of the political
speech/marketplace of ideas nexus. Critics plausibly argue that this nexus
operates "to exaggerate the evils of government and [as in Areopagitica] the
goodness of people," to "understate the risks and harms of speech and to
overstate its benefits,"" and to understate the physical and psychological
dangers, and often the futility, of attempts to counter bad speech with good.
Stanley Ingber concludes that the ideas marketplace changes little and has little
to do with an informed choice. Rather, this nexus serves to socialize the
citizenry into a conformity to some perspectives rather than others. The
"marketplace of ideas is as flawed as the economic market ... [, and] ideas
that support an entrenched power structure or ideology are most likely to gain
acceptance. "
37. TRIBE, supra note 27, § 12-2, at 793. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (discussing miscategorization risks arising because "pornography that is part of a
'serious work of art, a documentary on behavioral problems, or a medical or psychiatric teaching
device', may be entitled to constitutional protection"); SCHAUER, supra note 23, at 144 (there can
be no simple formula-"Obscene pictures may be used to make a political argument; commercial
advertising may be artistically creative; literature may carry an economic message."); Kretzmer,
supra note 18, at 477, 497; Wolfson, supra note 23, at 20, 33 (The outrageous can be the mark of
the avant garde as well as an attempt to control mediocrity, and symbolic speech is relatively
harmless unless it is directed against specific persons.).
38. BOLLINGER, supra note 15, at 237.
39. Ingber, supra note 3, at 17, 27. See BOLLINGER, supra note 15, at 9 (the idea that society
elevates itself through acts of extraordinary tolerance); Massaro, supra note 31, at 221; Ingber,
supra note 3, at 29-30 (discussing Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)) (government's
ability to remove books from library is limited, but government is not required to foster a diversity
of experience and an openness to change by, e.g., acquiring a broader range of books).
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Society is not a debating club like the Oxford Union, not a "town meeting
or... a group of scientists interested in figuring out some truth."' Producers
often speak to make a profit, and they are usually very different people from the
ostensible consumers, who often misunderstand or ignore the message, often
lack a viable channel for communicating their response, and are often afraid to
make fools of themselves by speaking up. Feeling cut off from an active
participation, many people are left with the passivity of an evening in front of
the TV that is controlled (even after the advent of cable TV) by oligopolistic
networks practicing a very definite viewpoint censorship. Many subjects or
perspectives are ignored or relegated to fragmented "market surrogates," like
a "counterculture" newspaper or a "public access" TV channel, because they are
thought to be "distressing" or "unentertaining" and, thus, unprofitable. Most
of effective political speech is really a commercial speech, and it would receive
less ("low value") protection if the Supreme Court pushed some of its analyses
to their logical conclusions.4
The deep (economic)42 rationality assumption characteristic of the ideas
marketplace, and of other markets as well, cannot hold in the real world:
it ignores a host of factors that make us human, including altruism,
habit, bigotry, panic, genius, luck or its absence, and factors such as
peer pressures, institutions, and cultures that turn us into social
40. BOLLINGER, supra note 15, at 229.
41. See BAKER, supra note 7, at 95 ("[M]arket practices, paradigm examples of instrumental
action, reliably produce only commodity ends."); id. at 204 ("Speaking anthropomorphically, the
competitive market directs commercial speech toward creating the world as 'profit' requires"-a
constant increase in desires which our purchases will not satisfy, and a molding of human images
around this purpose rather than around what we might want the world to become); TRIBE, supra note
27, § 12-18, at 943; C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA
L. REV. 964, 979-80 (1978) (the media mostly reinforce audience attitudes, and advertisers are
similarly unlikely to upset the status quo); Paul Brietzke, Urban Development and Human
Development, 25 IND. L. REV. 741, 758 (1992) (market surrogates spring up in areas where the
main market does not function, and they segregate activities when they are used to create barriers
to entering valuable markets); id. at 759. See also Ingber, supra note 3, at 25, 86 (discussing some
of the dangers of what arguably are market surrogates). But see Wolfson, supra note 23, at 40
(Consumers test out ideas much as they do goods and services-"there is freedom and autonomy,
prosperity and initiative.").
42. Economic analysis of social issues where commercial motives are not popularly thought to
dominate have been widely criticized, but analyses can be useful if they are modified to take account
of these criticisms. See, e.g., Brietzke, supra note 41, passim; Strossen, supra note 18, at 566;
Wolfson, supra note 23, at 3; id. at 37-38 (The law and economics of James Buchanan and some
others paradoxically agrees with the "old ... Marxist left"-"Speech is merely the epiphenomenon
of power," in a "despairing vision of society" which is "nihilistic and cynical to its core.").
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animals. A dehumanized, desocialized, and often sexist "economic
man" [or "speech man"] supposedly goes through life as if it were one
long series of analogies to isolated transactions on the New York Stock
Exchange .4
Rationality assumes the ability to separate the often seductive form of the
message from its substance, and rationality may dictate a recourse to quietude
or violence rather than to discussion." The actual outcomes from political
speech in a putative marketplace of ideas are often very different from the
rational ones projected by speech theory.
Neoclassical (or Chicago School) economics approaches the marketplace of
ideas by asking, in effect: How much is free speech worth to you, how much
are you willing to "pay" for it? This is an unhelpful perspective on insuring an
access to the exchange of information, and a political access generally (in
Holmes' second assumption), since the poor are unable to pay (in money, time,
education, or other scarce resources) as much as it takes to protect their speech.
Indeed, this is what makes them poor, in speech and other areas, and it makes
the ideas marketplace into an analogy which is very long on liberty (based on
the willingness to pay) and very short on equality (because many are unable to
pay). For example, the poor do not get to participate in our most efficient
information market: the New York Stock Exchange that, through its rapid
reactions, exerts a massive influence on which political policies can be adopted.
The New York Stock Exchange is a significant constraint on "robust" debate,
since some potentially worthwhile policies are not mentioned officially-for fear
of how the New York Stock Exchange will react. Even the garrulous Robert
Reich learned to be cautious. Also and to the extent that the "targets" of hate
43. Brietzke, supra note 41, at 753. See Baker, supra note 41, at 972; id. at 974 (Truth cannot
be objective, since "knowledge depends on how people's interests, needs, and experiences lead them
to slice and categorize an expanding mass of sense data."); id. at 977; Helle, supra note 18, at 1079
(citing Jay Janson on the rationality assumption in Milton, Jefferson, and Mill); id. at 1080 (such
rationality notions contrast sharply with the ideas of Hume, Rousseau, and Durkheim, who question
an individual rationality and whether the individual has existence or meaning apart from society);
Massaro, supra note 31, at 227-28 (citing Richard Rorty, some philosophers are skeptical of the
.rationalism" underlying free speech; notions of good and evil are contingent and there is no neutral,
ahistorical way of choosing among them-a perspective that makes free speech even more
compelling for some); supra notes 18-20, 23 and accompanying text. But see also BAKER, supra
note 7, at 18 ("Limitations on speech will deepen our admitted irrationality and increase the
probability of deleterious conclusions.").
44. SCHAUER, supra note 23, at 78; Ingber, supra note 3, at 31.
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speech are poor, they will lack the marketplace means of countervailing and
correcting hatred, or of rewarding tolerance, unless they can rely on the
paternalism of others who have the means.45
The marketplace of ideas analogy, thus, cannot explain the indeterminacy
(from a "duopoly," like that of pro-choice versus right to life) that sometimes
results from a bargaining over ideas between groups or communities with very
different "utility functions" (wants and needs). Based on the ability to pay as
they are, other political bargains "are all-too-determinate: the rich rarely
surrender even marginal advantages at a price the poor can afford, while the
poor frequently surrender important interests for a pittance."" This is
particularly likely if hate speech like R.A.V.'s deprives minorities of the
psychological integrity they need to bargain effectively. In brief: "No one has
seriously suggested that the existing distribution of access opportunities ... is
fair or is apportioned in accordance with the contribution each group can make
to a 'best' understanding of the world."' Under the circumstances, many
people who do not feel themselves part of a broad "establishment" (a group
which certainly includes most judges) believe the speech process to be unfair.
For them, the legitimating function of "free" speech, sought so avidly in Justice
Brandeis' Whitney concurrence, has failed to materialize.48
45. Brietzke, supra note 41, at 780. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context.
The Continuing Significance of Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 327, 339 (1992) ("[Dliscrimination
in the economic sphere is particularly egregious in a political system based on a market economy
purportedly dedicated to equal opportunity for wealth-maximizing individuals."); Baker, supra note
41, at 971 (exceptionally, obscenity cases ignore the marketplace willingness to pay criterion of
social value); Ingber, supra note 3, at 29-30; id. at 75, 86 (discussing a status quo bias, a blindness
to potential evils outside the market boundaries of ideas people are willing to pay for). We do not
trust lawful markets to allocate some of the other things irrelevant to democracy-crack or
commercialized sex, for example-so why trust the market to allocate racist ideas? See Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 n.9 (1974) ("an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to
undo the harm of defamatory falsehood"-"truth rarely catches up with a lie").
46. Brietzke, supra note 41, at 754. See Brietzke, supra note 25, at 879.
47. Baker, supra note 41, at 978. See BAKER, supra note 7, at204 (quoting C.B. Macpherson)
("the market system ... creates the wants which it satisfies," and there is no reason to expect that
this "will reflect or permit" the "full development of the individual personality"); ROBIN PAUL
MALLOY, PLANNING FOR SERFDOM: LEGAL ECONOMIC DISCOURSE AND DOWNTOWN
DEVELOPMENT 70 (1991) ("[W]ealth maximization discourse can ignore the issue of whether African
Americans or Hispanics, for instance, have anything to exchange in the marketplace," or whether
they "have been systematically deprived of an opportunity to acquire the wealth necessary to bargain
voluntarily."); Aleinikoff, supra note 45 (quoted in supra note 45); Baker, supra note 41, at 975 (In
the face of disagreement, the ideas marketplace generates the "best" understanding only if it
"distributes influence among various people or groups such that optimal compromises are
reached."); Brietzke, supra note 41, at 787.
48. BAKER, supra note 7, at 16-17; Harel, supra note 36, at 1919-21. See Ingber, supra note
3, at 49 (Dominant groups with establishment views see the ideas market as working well, while
dissidents see this market as an ideology which diffuses protest by giving the illusion of control.).
But see also id. at 36 (Alexander Bickel's argument that the fairness of the ideas market, rather than
964
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If it can be said to exist, the ideas marketplace is shot through with "market
failures," 49 the effects of which often make governmental interferences seem
puny by comparison. Today, if not in Holmes' or Milton's time, there is no
"free" or "natural" ideas market. There is no "there" there because
unorganized and perhaps unorganizable speakers are unable to compete with the
wealthy corporations and organized interest groups that have access to
sophisticated public relations tools and communications technologies. Wealthy
and powerful groups seldom participate in the ideas market unless a profit can
be made or their interests are somehow threatened. When such groups choose
to participate, they sometimes succeed in fragmenting or (by erecting barriers
to entry) in closing information markets to rival ideas,' so as to increase their
profits or to gain "economic rents" s through the political process. A badly-
its wisdom, justifies its continued acceptance).
49. Unfortunately, the theory of market failure is not well developed and consists of little more
than a series of policy recommendations. Market failures arguably include: the problem of "public
goods," of things which belong to everyone and for which no one wants to pay; "externalities,"
social costs and benefits that are not taken into account by private parties in their transactions; and
fragmentation, barriers to entry, and a lack of competition in markets. "Few economists realize or
admit that market failures... are literally matters of definition, of what we want markets to do that
they are not doing." Brietzke, supra note 41, at 763 n.75, 765. In sum, the market failure
argument is that: "Real-world conditions prevent the completely laissez-faire economic
market-praised as a social means to facilitate the optimal allocation and production of goods-from
achieving socially desired results." BAKER, supra note 7, at 4.
The overall effect is that speech is a public (free) good for some-frequently and paradoxically
those best able to pay for it-but not for others. See id. at 45, 285 n.5. A market failure
perspective tolerates governmental intervention for efficient allocations or desired distributions in
ways that do not restrict speech freedoms. Baker, supra note 41, at 981-82. For lists of market
failures concerning speech see id. at 965 ("monopoly control of the media, lack of access of
disfavored or impoverished groups, techniques of behavior manipulation, irrational response to
propaganda, and the nonexistence of value-free, objective truth"); Ingber, supra note 3, at 38-39
(pickets, leafleting, and sound trucks are no longer effective counterweights to the mass media;
.monopolistic practices, economies of scale, and an unequal distribution of resources" determine
which ideas reach the public, and access to the media is fraught with status quo biases); Massaro,
supra note 31, at 221 (The "prevailing metaphors and cliches" are insensitive to the relative market
power of various speakers, and the physical and psychological dangers of meeting bad speech with
good.).
50. BAKER, supra note 7, at 38; Brietzke, supra note 41, at 742, 759, 776. If an ideas
marketplace exists, it presumably operates on university campuses. Yet the nation's universities
have recently offered abundant evidence of market failures that "more speech" has done little or
nothing to cure: "severe or pervasive harassment based on membership in a group whose
identifying characteristic is practically or historically linked to serious prejudice." Mary Ellen Gale,
On Curbing Racial Speech, I RESPONSIVE COMM. 47, 56 (1990-91). See id. at 54.
51. Economic rents are the difference between the rate of return in a market where the supply
is temporarily or permanently fixed and the rate of return in a competitive market. Talented baseball
players earn economic rents because the "natural" supply of their skills is narrowly limited, and an
exclusive food franchisee at an airport also earns economic rents because the franchisor has
artificially restricted the supply of food and drink to a "captive" audience. Similarly, a racist may
seek wealth and/or power by artificially restricting his or her "targets'" life-chances.
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informed or misinformed public, a market failure in itself, sends inconsistent
signals to politicians, and this helps special interest groups frequently to
dominate politics by manipulating information and influence. Consider the level
and tone of recent "debates" over the crime and health care bills.
While there is little agreement on the precise nature and significance of
market failures over speech, a market failure perspective would have us focusing
on the relevant issues, rather than on implausible assumptions about how
individual interests in speech are automatically transformed into the public
interest by an invisible hand. Neoclassical or Chicago School economists
recognize market failures as the sole justification for regulation, and Laurence
Tribe cites cases for the proposition that the First Amendment "right to know"
carries "the implication that government, while it may not close the market, may
move to correct its defects and regulate its incidental consequences."52
Some speech regulation undoubtedly stems from politicians seeking a
particular speech outcome, while doubting their premises and power. But a
market failure perspective shows that this is not the sole explanation of speech
regulation that Holmes assumed it to be.53 At the least, the political speech
category should be finely tuned: made somewhat less overinclusive and intrusive
on the core policies that motivate the creation of unprotected speech categories.
The Supreme Court should open up private and public channels of
communication, through modest attempts to equalize access to the ideas markets.
This would ameliorate market failures and create a better balance-a more
dynamic tension, really-between a liberty and an equality in speech. Such
efforts would certainly not amount to the broad equality of opportunity or the
In brief, failures in speech and other political markets, see supra note 49, enable special
interest groups to dominate politics by making "bribes." The bribe may take the legally-sanitized
form of a political action committee's contribution, or it may be a credible promise (or threat) to
deliver votes on election day. Bribes serve to mitigate political opposition, and the expectation is
that the politician will grant opportunities for economic rents in return. Brietzke, supra note 41, at
769. See Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1331, 1359,
& n. 147 (1988). A racist group, for example, may bribe key politicians who will then promote or
wink at racist activities. Much, if not most, of the information available for consideration in an
ideas marketplace is now channelled through government. Ingber, supra note 3, at 37, 74-75.
Much of this information is controlled through the bribery, economic rent-seeking, etc. of special
interest groups, tactics which amount to erecting barriers to entering the ideas market.
52. TRIBE, supra note 27, §§ 12-19, at 946 ("See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969) .... To be sure, the Court has ordinarily rejected the notion that the speech rights of
some may be sacrificed to enhance the relative access of others [citing cases] .... "). See id. at
946 (Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), supports this proposition); id.
at 946-47 ("This strand of doctrine is most pronounced in the commercial speech field," citing
cases); Baker, supra note 41, at 1006 (discussed in note 54, infra). See also Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 285 (1952) (quoted in note 54, infra).
53. BOLLINGER, supra note 15, at 62 (citing Holmes).
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governmental determination of speech outcomes that the speech traditionalists
seem to fear.
4
Virulently racist speech could, for example, be treated as an "unfair trade
practice" or as "false and misleading advertising" in an ideas marketplace. Such
antitrust-type regulations would be designed to ameliorate failures in competition
that perpetuate demonstrably false ideas like R.A.V.'s, ideas which still bear the
taint of governmental support under existing First Amendment interpretations. 5
Analyses under the Coase Theorem56 suggest another justification for the
54. See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 285 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Through Dennis, 341 U.S.
494, and Feiner, 340 U.S. 315, the Court "engrafted the right of regulation onto the First
Amendment"-"an ominous and alarming trend."); BAKER, supra note 7, at 85 (The key issues of
.normal politics' are-"What types of inputs are proper and how the process can be designed to
respect our equality and liberty while promoting our humanity and strengthening community."); id.
at 90 (the main merit of the "market failure theory" is its concern with reducing domination);
BOLUNGER, supra note 15, at 107 (Constitutional law is not simply "a barrier against entry"; it can
be used to help "shape the intellectual character of society."); SCHAUER, supra note 23, at 40 (A
sovereign people can empower government to restrict speech, just like any other liberty.); Baker,
supra note 41, at 981-82 (discussed in supra note 49); id. at 1006 (the "market failure model"
recognizes affirmative claims to get needed information which is not otherwise readily available).
But see BAKER, supra note 7, at 41 (such a model operates to sacrifice liberty to gain equality);
Baker, supra note 41, at 989-90 (market failure models should be rejected, since they restrict liberty
and require much state intervention). I hope that my proposals here and infra cure these defects,
although my proposals are unlikely to please speech traditionalists.
55. See Strossen, supra note 18, at 545. But see id. at 560 ("If the marketplace of ideas cannot
be trusted to winnow out the hateful, then there is no reason to believe that censorship will do so.").
My proposals aim to minimize censorship, but there is obviously a need for caution on this
constitutional tightrope.
56. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). In the ideal
Coasian world of zero transaction costs, we would expect a speaker to abandon his constitutionally-
protected racist speech on payment of a bribe of the appropriate size; this is, after all, the wealth-
maximizing thing to do. But as we know, such a bribe is unlikely to be paid and accepted in the
real world: a deeply offended individual may be willing but unable (too poor) to pay the bribe, and
the (transaction) costs of organizing a group of offended people to bargain with the racist and to
share the cost of the bribe may be too high (because of, inter alia, "free riders" within the group).
The would-be bribing individual or group may be irrational or reluctant to proceed because there
are few (if any) constitutional means of preventing the speaker's reversion to racist speech at some
later date. The speaker might not accept the bribe because he is economically irrational (he is a
True Believer in racism, immune to bribes), because (as a "holdout") he is trying to extort a bribe
far in excess of the benefit of the speech to himself, and/or because he speaks for some or many
others ("externalities") who cannot be contacted and bribed due to high transaction costs and/or their
own irrationalities or attempts to act as holdouts.
On this basis, a legal prohibition of at least the most virulent forms of racist speech is justified
because it approximates the "bargain" the parties would reach "voluntarily" under the Coase
Theorem, were it not for high transaction costs (including free rider and holdout problems),
irrationalities, and market failures (including externalities and the legal failure of being unable to
enforce a future abstention from racist speech). The proposed regulation would be wealth
maximizing for society: the gainers (offended persons) would likely gain so much that they could
compensate the loser(s) (the speaker and perhaps his friends) and still come out ahead. (As is the
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regulation of virulently racist speech, and also that R.A. V. was wrongly decided.
Carlos Santiago Nino offers a related philosphical perspective, one based
on the notion that a constitutional liberalism like ours serves to protect a
personal autonomy. The acts of officials, attempts to censor hate speech for
example, are widely seen as a greater danger to this autonomy than are official
omissions: failures to deal with the indignities that flow from hate speech for
example. Nino deals with this facile lawyer's distinction between acts and
omissions by proposing a standard akin to John Rawls' "difference
principle: " 51 "one may restrain the autonomy of some if this results in
increasing the autonomy of people who are less autonomous than those whose
autonomy is being diminished."58 In other words, we can restrain the
autonomy of those who would utter virulently racist speech, to benefit people
who are rendered "less autonomous" by hatred and discrimination in the wider
society. Such a maximization of autonomy is one major goal of the market-
place of ideas analogy. Nino's standard would also help to implement another
liberal maxim-Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative-by
treating less autonomous people as ends (by, e.g., promoting their dignity)
rather than as the means for venting racist spleens.5 9
V. CONCLUSION
Milton's world is not (forgive me) "Wayne's World": collectively, we are
now better educated, less religious or at least less reverent, more democratic,
and somewhat more egalitarian in the distribution of wealth and power.
Organizational and technological changes have raised many concerns that Milton
never considered, while laying to rest some of his worst fears. For example,
case with most other wealth-maximizing changes in the law, this compensation need not actually be
paid.) Over time, this legal change would likely make it more difficult (costly) to organize racists
and easier (cheaper) to organize their opponents, and this would erode support for politicians who
advocate or wink at racism. See generally BAKER, supra note 7, at 83; Brietzke, supra note 41, at
769. On this analysis, R.A. V. would appear to be wrongly decided because it protects rather than
regulates virulently racist speech.
57. JOHN RAWLS', POLITICAL LIBERALISM 6-7 (1993) ("[T]he social and economic inequalities
attached to offices and positions are to be adjusted so that, whatever the level of those inequalities
, they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.").
58. CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 61 (1996).
See id. at 49; id. at 56 (tendency under liberalism to protect a negative and formal liberty, at the
expense of claims to equality and social justice).
59. See id. at 47 (The value of autonomy is reflected in the moral discourse of
liberalism-achieving cooperation through a consensus based on reasons rather than authority or
coercion.); id. at 62 (Kant's treating of people as ends rather than means is a liberal canon of
"nonexploitation"); id. at 65 (autonomy harmed by omissions as well as acts, especially by officials
who, e.g., spend money for defense rather than for public housing, in an interpersonal morality of
enormous scope).
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it is now unlikely that a "good Booke" (which now seems to be one that many
will pay to read) could be erased from civilization. But seeking to better
Milton, we frequently wind up doing worse: must we "watch-and even
applaud-when cultural and constitutional tools designed to plow the social
ground for planting seeds of tolerance and diversity instead are beaten into
swords by bigots and wielded to injure or destroy the fragile hopes and rights
of historically despised minorities? " 60 The answer is "yes" for the Court that
decided R.A. V., but few outcomes remain stable for long in our First
Amendment jurisprudence.
This jurisprudence embodies many of our deepest collective beliefs-or at
least what five justices at any given time believe we believe-and we and the
justices constantly pine for something which is intellectually and politically
"better" from our speech theory. We may have lost some of our historic fear
that all speech regulation inevitably frustrates the will of the people, and perhaps
we realize that this will of the "people" often gets badly manipulated through an
ostensibly free speech. The symbolic and educative functions of law could now
be used a little more actively, to help create the kind of society we can and
should become. 6' Absent a reformulation, the marketplace of ideas analogy
serves to celebrate failures of legal imagination. Perhaps it is the firm
expectation that we can and should do better that is Areopagitica's main
contribution to getting our minds clear for the future.'
60. Gale, supra note 50, at 48. See BOLLINGER, supra note 15, at 97 (Under the
"straightforward calculation of expediency" characteristic of the "fortress model" of free speech,
"the legal problem in the end appeared to come down to a simple matter of the need to exchange
protection of bad speech for greater security for good speech.").
61. SCHAUER, supra note 23, at 84. See BAKER, supra note 7, at 205:
The very purpose of legal regulation, of political choice, is often to consider which
values we want to create and which we want to discourage-that is, to consider what
type of people do we want to be. The market's incapacity to embody this self-
definitional dialogue makes a public or political sphere essential.
62. See Laski, supra note 3, at 169 (how could Milton, the angry foe of the English Church,
"become the protagonist of a secular humanism the principles of which we have not yet ventured
to apply after three centuries of further experience"); Read, supra note 21, at 122 ("the dust has
settled on ten thousand tracts" that originally provoked Areopagitica, but every new tyranny brings
it to life again); supra note 2 and accompanying text. But see also de Madariaga, supra note 19,
at 59 (Milton "failed to live up to our standards of what an apostle of freedom of thought should
be.").
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